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COMMENT
A WRONG TURN ON THE ROAD TO TORT REFORM:
THE SUPREME COURT'S ADOPTION OF DE NOVO
REVIEW IN COOPER INDUSTRIES v. LEATHERMAN
TOOL GROUP, INC.*
INTRODUCTION
As the tides of tort reform sweep through the nation,
punitive damages remain at the center of fierce political and
legal debate. Critics complain that tort law has run amok, with
juries awarding multi-million dollar punitive damages awards
on the basis of nothing more than whim or caprice.
Legislatures have joined in the fray by advocating everything
from statutory caps2 to raised burdens of proof.3 However, the
© 2003 Lisa M. White. All Rights Reserved.
One only has to look at the website of the American Tort Reform
Association ("ATRA") to see the latest developments in the battle to reform tort law:
http://www.atra.org.
' See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-4 (2002) (capping punitive damages at
the greater of three times compensatory damages or $50,000); FLA. STAT. ch. 768.73
(2002) (capping certain punitive damage awards at the greater of three times
compensatory damages or $500,000); NEV. REV. STAT ANN. 42.005 (2002) (capping
punitive damages awards at three times the compensatory damages if more than
$100,000 or $350,000 if the compensatory damages are less than $100,000); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:15-5.14 (2002) (limiting punitive damages to the greater of $350,000 or five
times the compensatory award).
' See, e.g., TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (2002) (requiring
clear and convincing evidence); OKLA. STAT. § 9.1 (2002) (requiring clear and
convincing evidence); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (2002) (requiring proof beyond a
reasonable doubt); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.184 (2002) (requiring clear and
convincing evidence); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(1)(a) (2002) (requiring a predicate
award of compensatory damages and clear and convincing evidence).
Some legislatures also have enacted statutes that require a percentage of
the plaintiffs punitive damages award to be paid to the state. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT.
§ 18.540 (2001) (requiring 60% of punitive award to be paid to the state); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-18-1(3)(a) (2001) (requiring 50% of a punitive award over $20,000 to be paid
to the state); ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(j) (2000) (requiring 50% of a punitive damages
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strongest advocates of tort reform are not found on Capitol Hill
or in state capitals across the country; they are among the nine
members of the Supreme Court. Using the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment as its touchstone, the Supreme
Court has spent the last thirteen years reining in the jury's
broad discretion to award punitive damages.4
Beginning in 1989, the Supreme Court hinted in
Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,'5 that a due
process "check" might exist on a jury's discretion to award
punitive damages. The Court addressed the issue again two
years later in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance v. Haslip.6
Focusing on procedural due process, the Court found that
Alabama's common law method for assessing punitive damages
was constitutional.7 Refusing to "draw a bright mathematical
line"' as to what would or would not pass constitutional
muster, the Court nevertheless found that Alabama's jury
instructions9  and post-award judicial scrutiny °  provided
procedural safeguards that ensured a fair and reasonable
11
process.
award to be paid to the state).
4 See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); Browning-Ferris Indus.
v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257 (1989); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S.
443 (1993); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
5 492 U.S. 257. The Court in Browning-Ferris noted that because the
defendants had "failed to raise their due process argument before either the District
Court or the Court of Appeals, and made no specific mention of it in their petition for
certiorari in this Court, we shall not consider its effect on this award." Id. at 277.
6 499 U.S. 1.
7 Id. at 17.
Under the traditional common-law approach, the amount of the punitive
award is initially determined by a jury instructed to consider the gravity of
the wrong and the need to deter similar wrongful conduct. The jury's
determination is then reviewed by trial and appellate courts to ensure that it
is reasonable.
Id. at 15.
8 Id. at 18.
' After "thoroughly reviewing" the Alabama state court jury instructions, the
Supreme Court found that although they gave the jury "significant discretion," the
instructions "expressly described . . . the purposes of punitive damages, namely ...
deterrence and retribution." Id. at 19.
'o Judges in Alabama apply a rigorous post-verdict test, known as the
Hammond/Green Oil factors, to scrutinize punitive damages awards. Id. at 20;
Hammond v. Gadsen, 493 So. 2d 1374, 1379 (Ala. 1986); Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539
So. 2d 218, 222 (Ala. 1989). This test encompasses a variety of substantive standards to
ensure that the punitive award does "not exceed an amount that will accomplish
society's goals of punishment and deterrence." Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20-21; Green Oil, 539
So. 2d at 222.
11 Haslip, 499 U.S. at 22.
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Two years later, however, the focus on procedural due
process as a method for curbing a jury's discretion to award
punitive damages began to lose its shine. In TXO Production
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.," using procedural due
process to analyze jury discretion interested only a plurality of
the Court."3 Although the plurality noted that a substantive
due process issue might arise if a jury's punitive damages
award was "grossly excessive," 4 the plurality refused to take
the idea any further. 5 As Justice Stevens explained, "[b]ecause
no two cases are truly identical, meaningful comparisons of
such [punitive damages] awards are difficult to make."'6 In
contrast, other members of the Court, most notably Justice
O'Connor, advocated for a substantive limit on the jury's
discretion. 7 Arguing that jurors were not "infallible guardians
of the public good," 8 O'Connor urged the need for "objective
factors" 9 that judges should apply when reviewing a jury's
punitive damages award."
Substantive due process finally came to the forefront in
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,2' where a majority of the
Court held that a jury's assessment of punitive damages can be
so excessive as to violate due process.22 The Court formulated
three guideposts, known as the BMW factors, to assist trial
judges in determining whether a jury's punitive damages
award crosses the constitutional line: (1) the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; (2) the disparity
between the harm or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff
and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference
12 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (plurality opinion).
1" The TXO plurality was made up of Justices Stevens, Rehnquist and
Blackmun. Id. at 443.
14 Id. at 457.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 TXO, 509 U.S. at 473 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
18 Id.
19 O'Connor thought the following objective factors would be helpful in
informing judges' decisions when reviewing juries' punitive damages awards: '[the]
relationship between the punitive damages award and compensatory damages, awards
of punitive damages upheld against other defendants in the same jurisdiction, awards
upheld for similar torts in other jurisdictions, and legislatively designated penalties for
similar misconduct." Id. at 480-81.
20 Id.
21 517 U.S. 559 (1996). BMW involved a $2 million punitive damages award
for BMW's failure to notify customers that it repainted cars damaged in delivery. Id. at
564.
22 Id. at 567.
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between the punitive damages award and the civil or criminal
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.23
The Court's most recent decision24 addressing punitive
damages is Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,"
a case involving a trademark dispute between two competing
hardware manufacturers. Cooper, however, marks a notable
shift in the Court's focus. Instead of refining its procedural and
substantive checks on the discretion of the jury, the Cooper
Court placed the trial judge in the cross hairs of tort reform.
In Cooper, the Court decided that federal appellate
courts must now apply a de novo standard when reviewing a
district court's ruling on the constitutional excessiveness of a
punitive damages award.26 In other words, after a trial judge
applies the BMW factors to a jury's punitive damages award, a
circuit court should subject that decision to plenary review,
thereby duplicating the trial court's analysis. According to the
majority in Cooper, de novo review will "help to assure the
uniform treatment of similarly situated persons."27 In addition,
the Court reasoned that de novo review will help to "clarify the
legal principles" and "unify precedent."28 However, the Cooper
Court's adoption of de novo review is a wrong turn on the road
to tort reform. Indeed, the benefits of de novo review will be
minimal, while the application of this new standard will come
at a great cost to both litigants and the judicial system itself.
Part I of this Comment explains the facts that gave rise
to the Cooper case and analyzes the Court's opinion and
reasons for adopting de novo review. Part II argues that the
Cooper Court wrongly departed from the traditional abuse of
discretion standard in reviewing a trial court's determination
of constitutional punitive excessiveness. Essentially, the
23 Id. at 575.
24 Since the publication of this Comment, the Supreme Court has granted
certiorari and heard arguments in another case involving punitive damages. See
Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 981564, 2001 Utah LEXIS 170 (Utah
Oct. 19, 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 2326 (2002). The issue in State Farm revolves
around whether the Utah Supreme Court correctly applied one of the BMW factors in
its post-verdict review of a punitive damages award. See Anthony J. Sebok, An
Upcoming Supreme Court Punitive Damages Case Will Determine How Much an
Individual State's Courts Can Affect Companies' Nationwide Conduct (Oct. 28, 2002),
available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20021028.html (last visited Jan. 23,
2003).
25 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
26 Id. at 435-36.
27 Id. at 438.
28 Id. at 436.
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question of whether a punitive damages award is
unconstitutional is a mixed question of law and fact.29
Therefore, de novo review is only appropriate if appellate
inquiry will help to clarify the law and unify precedent or if the
appellate court is in a better position to apply the legal
standard. °
Accordingly, Part II of this Comment establishes that de
novo review will not accomplish either of the Court's stated
objectives. First, from a practical standpoint, district court
judges are simply better positioned than appellate courts to
apply the BMW factors, because they are more familiar with
the facts of each case and benefit from the first-hand
opportunity to assess witness credibility and demeanor.
Second, because the assessment of punitive damages awards is
highly fact and case-specific, there will be little room for the
generalized comparisons that are necessary to clarify the law
and provide useful precedent.
Part III of this Comment illustrates some of the
consequences of de novo review for determinations of
constitutional punitive excessiveness. First, de novo review will
result in inconsistent standards of appellate review. For
example, it will force appellate courts to distinguish between
common law claims of punitive excessiveness, which require
deferential review, and constitutional claims of punitive
excessiveness, which now require de novo review. Second, de
novo review will over-burden appellate courts without
obtaining results that would differ significantly from those
found under the traditional abuse of discretion review.
Moreover, appellate review for abuse of discretion always
provides a meaningful and intensive post-verdict check on
excessive punitive damages awards, thereby rendering the new
31standard unnecessary.
See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982) (finding that
mixed questions of law and fact are defined by an application of an objective legal
standard to an underlying set of facts); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696
(1996) (holding that when the issue is "whether the facts satisfy the relevant statutory
or constitutional standard," it is a mixed question of law and fact) (internal citations
omitted).
30 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985).
See generally Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages: Current
Data and Further Inquiry, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 15.
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This Comment concludes that the Cooper Court's
decision to subject trial judges' BMW analyses to plenary
review is misguided and will not lead to more equitable
punitive verdicts. If the Court truly seeks a system of punitive
damages that comports with the requirements of due process, it
should return to the focus of its original inquiry: the discretion
of the jury.
I. COOPER INDUSTRIES V. LEATHERMAN TOOL GROUP, INC.
A. Facts
In the 1980s, Leatherman Tool Group ("Leatherman")
introduced a multifunction pocket tool called the Pocket
Survival Tool, or PST.3" Approximately ten years later, Cooper
Industries ("Cooper") decided to manufacture and market its
own multifunction pocket tool, known as the ToolZall.33 Cooper
copied the basic design features of the PST and added a few
new features of its own.34 In 1996, Cooper unveiled the ToolZall
at the National Hardware Show in Chicago, using promotional
materials, which were actually modified pictures of
Leatherman's PST.35 In fact, a Cooper employee created a
mock-up for the ToolZall by altering an actual PST and adding
some distinguishing fastenings.36  Cooper used these
promotional materials depicting the altered PST in its
marketing efforts all around the United States." Cooper also
sent a touched-up drawing of a PST to its international sales
group.38
After the trade show, Leatherman filed a lawsuit in
federal district court alleging violations of trade-dress
infringement, unfair competition and false advertising under
32 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 427.
"Id.
Id. Apparently, Cooper had intended the design of the ToolZall to be
identical to that of Leatherman's PST, but changed the design after Leatherman filed
suit. Id.
M Id. When the promotional materials appeared at the hardware show,
Cooper had yet to even manufacture the first ToolZall. Id. at 427-28.
36 Id. The mock-up was created by "grinding the Leatherman trademark from
the handles and pliers of a PST and substituting the unique fastenings that were to be
used on the ToolZall." Also, Cooper retouched a photograph to erase the Leatherman
trademark indentation on the PST. Id.
3' Cooper, 532 U.S. at 427-28.
38 Id.
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Section 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946 ("Lanham Act"). 9 In
addition, Leatherman asserted common law claims of unfair
competition, passing off and false advertising.4° The district
court granted Leatherman's request for a preliminary
injunction and prohibited Cooper from marketing the ToolZall
using the modified PST photographs.4' Cooper withdrew the
ToolZall from the market, but the company made no attempt to
retrieve the altered promotional materials from its customers
for well over three months.42
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found for
Leatherman on all three common law claims.43 In regard to the
statutory claims, however, the jury decided that although
Leatherman had trademark rights in the appearance of the
PST, Cooper's infringement had not damaged Leatherman's
rights." The jury awarded Leatherman $50,000 in
compensatory damages and $4.5 million in punitive damages.45
Cooper then asserted a due process challenge to the punitive
damages award, arguing that the damages were "grossly
excessive" under BMW.46 The district court, reviewing the
punitive damages award, found that the award fell within the
permissible constitutional range.47 In upholding the punitive
damages award, the district court specifically pointed to
Cooper's intentional use of the modified PST.4" Moreover, the
39 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
40 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 428.
41 Id. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., No. 96-1346-MA, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21976 (D. Or. Dec. 18, 1996).
42 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 428. The Supreme Court noted that although Cooper
had "anticipatorily sent a notice to its sales personnel ordering a recall of all
promotional materials containing the pictures of the PST," it failed to retrieve the
materials from its customers until the "following April." For this reason, "the offending
promotional materials continued to appear in catalogs and advertisements well into
1997." Id.
4 Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., No. 96-1346-MA, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22763, at *1 (D. Or. Nov. 17, 1997).
44 Id.
45 Id. The jury verdict was in the form of several special interrogatories. In
order for the jury to award punitive damages, they had to answer "yes" to the following
interrogatory: "Has Leatherman shown by clear and convincing evidence that by
engaging in false advertising or passing off, Cooper acted with malice, or showed a
reckless and outrageous indifference to a highly unreasonable risk of harm and has
acted with a conscious indifference to Leatherman's rights?" Cooper, 532 U.S. at 428-
29.
46 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 428-29.
47 Id. Leatherman, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22763, at *10. The district court
directed 60% of the punitive damages award to be paid to the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Account of the State of Oregon. Id. at *11.
48 Leatherman, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22763, at *9.
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trial court noted that the large award was appropriate given
the "defendant's size and assets."49 Finally, the district court
issued a permanent injunction against Cooper, prohibiting it
from marketing the original ToolZall in the United States and
certain foreign countries."
Cooper then appealed both the injunction and the
punitive damages award."' In an unpublished opinion, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied an abuse of
discretion standard and upheld the trial judge's finding that
the punitive damages award was not a violation of due
process." Although noting that this was not a typical case of
passing off,53 the Ninth Circuit found that Cooper's use of the
PST gave it an unfair advantage "by allowing it to use the
sweat of Leatherman's efforts to obtain a 'mock-up' more
cheaply, easily, and quickly than if it had started from scratch
or waited until samples of its own product were ready."54 The
appeals court also pointed to evidence that Cooper had failed to
act promptly to remove the altered promotional materials after
the injunction was issued, suggesting "an indifference to legal
consequences."55 Therefore, the court concluded, the trial judge
did not abuse his discretion in allowing the punitive damages
award to stand.56
In a separate published opinion, the court addressed
Cooper's challenge to the district court's injunction against
copying the PST.57 The Ninth Circuit held that trademark laws
49 Id.
50 Id. at *7. Finding that the marketing in countries such as Russia was "de
minimis" and did not have a "significant effect upon [Cooper's] U.S. revenues," the
district court judge ordered the permanent injunction for only twenty-two out of the
seventy-one foreign countries in which Cooper had marketed the PST. The foreign
countries included in the permanent injunction were: Australia, Austria, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Israel, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, South Africa, South Korea and the United Kingdom. Id. at *8.
51 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 429.
52 Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Nos. 98-35147, 98-35415,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 33657, at *4 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 1999).
53 Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that typically, "one who engages in passing off
is attempting to persuade the customer that an unknown or inferior product being sold
is a famous or superior product of another." Id. Here, however, a customer who bought
a ToolZall based on the picture of the modified PST would essentially get exactly what
they saw and paid for in the photograph. Id.
54 Id. at *5.
55 id.
56 Id.
" Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., 199 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir.
1999).
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did not protect the overall appearance of the PST because the
combination of its distinguishing features was "functional."8
Although "Cooper had deliberately copied the PST, it acted
lawfully in doing so. " " Thus, the court set aside the permanent
injunction."
B. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether
the Court of Appeals had applied the correct standard of review
in evaluating the constitutionality of the punitive damages
award."1 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, found that
the Ninth Circuit erred in applying an abuse of discretion
standard.62 Instead, the Court held that federal appeals courts
should now use a de novo standard of review in determining
whether a punitive damages award is grossly excessive under
the BMW guideposts. 3 Undertaking its own de novo application
of the BMW guideposts to the damages award, the Court found
that plenary review likely would have resulted in a finding that
the punitive damages award against Cooper was
unconstitutionally excessive.64
The Court began its opinion by distinguishing between
the purpose of compensatory and punitive damages.65
Compensatory damages, the Court pointed out, are "intended
to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by
reason of the defendant's wrongful conduct."' Therefore, a
jury's assessment of these damages is a "factual
determination."67 In contrast, punitive damages are "quasi-
criminal" and operate to deter and punish the defendant's
Id. at 1014. Features of a product that are functional are not protected
under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. In order for a feature to be deemed functional,
it must be essential to the product's purpose or use or affect the cost or the quality of
the product. 2 JEROME GILSON ET AL., TRADEMARK PRACTICE AND PROTECTION §
7.02[7] [fl (2002).
59 Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 439 (2001).
60 2 GILSON ETAL., supra note 58 § 7.02[7][fl.
61 Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., 205 F.3d 1351 (9th Cir.
1999), cert. granted, 531 U.S. 923 (2000) (No. 99-2035).
62 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 431.
Id.
6 Id. at 443.
. Id. at 432.
6 Id.
67 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 432.
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conduct." Thus, the Court concluded, the jury's assessment of
punitive damages is not a factual issue but simply "an
expression of its moral condemnation."69
The Court then addressed the role of state legislatures
in limiting punitive damages.7 ° The Court stated that in the
context of capping punitive damages, as in defining criminal
offenses, the legislatures have "extremely broad discretion."
71
Noting that many states have already enacted statutes capping
punitive damages, the Court found that jury determinations of
punitive damages within these statutory limits would be
acceptable.72 In other words, if a trial judge determined that a
jury's verdict was within the state law confines and the
defendant raised no constitutional issue, a reviewing court in
the federal system should apply the abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo review.
However, the Court also pointed out that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes
substantive limits on states' discretion to impose both criminal
penalties and punitive damages.7 Specifically, the Court
pointed to five decisions exemplifying these limits regarding
deprivations of life, liberty and property.7" In all of those
decisions, the Court noted that the findings that the
punishments were severely disproportionate to the gravity of
the defendant's misdeeds were based on due process
violations.75 The Court acknowledged that although there had
never been an exact constitutional formula, it had repeatedly





72 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 433.
73 Id.
14 Id. at 433-36. First, under BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 562 (1996), the Court held that the Due Process Clause prevented states from
imposing "grossly excessive" punishments on tortfeasors. Second, in Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 787 (1982), the Court held that a death sentence was not a
legitimate penalty under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for someone who
had neither taken, nor attempted to take, a life. Third, in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 592 (1977), the Court held that a death sentence for a rape was "grossly
disproportionate" to the crime itself. Fourth, under Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303
(1983), the sentence of life imprisonment without parole for nonviolent felonies was
also disproportionate to the offense. And fifth, in United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S.
321, 324 (1998), the Court held that a monetary forfeiture for violating a customs
reporting requirement was "grossly disproportional" to the gravity of the offense.
" Cooper, 532 U.S. at 436.
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violated a defendant's due process rights:76 (1) the degree of the
defendant's reprehensibility; (2) the relationship between the
penalty and the harm to the victim caused by the defendant's
actions; and (3) sanctions imposed in other cases for
comparable misconduct." The Court also noted that in each of
the six cases it "independent [ly] examin[ed] . .. the relevant
criteria."78 In other words, the Court itself reviewed the
constitutionality of these deprivations in both criminal and
civil contexts under a de novo standard.
The Court then analogized determinations of
constitutional punitive excessiveness to determinations of
reasonable suspicion and probable cause.79 In Ornelas v. United
States," the Court held that trial judges' determinations of
reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de
novo on appeal.8' The Cooper Court found that the reasons
given in support of the Ornelas holding were equally applicable
in a punitive damages context.82 First, the exact meanings of
probable cause and reasonable suspicion are not easily
defined." Instead, they take their "substantive content from
the particular contexts in which the standards are being
assessed."' The Court found that this was analogous to the
concept of whether a punitive damages award is
unconstitutionally excessive.8 Second, the legal rules for
probable cause and reasonable suspicion acquire their content
only through application.86 Therefore, an appellate court must
conduct de novo review in order to "maintain control" and
"clarify the legal principles."87 Again, the Court analogized
probable cause and reasonable suspicion to the assessment of
punitive damages, finding that the BMW factors would
"acquire more meaningful content through case-by-case




71 Id. at 435.
80 517 U.S. 690 (1996).
8' Id. at 691.
82 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 436.
83 Id.
Id. (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)).
85 Id. at 437.
Id. (citing Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697).
87 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 437.
8' Id. at 435.
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in general, de novo review was useful to "unify precedent" and
"stabilize the law."89
The Cooper Court then addressed several
counterarguments to the adoption of a de novo standard of
review." First, Leatherman argued that de novo appellate
review would implicate the Seventh Amendment's Re-
Examination Clause.9  Because courts historically have
regarded the assessment of punitive damages as a "fact" within
the meaning of the Seventh Amendment,92 de novo review
would amount to a re-trying of that fact, in violation of the
Seventh Amendment.93 In response to this argument, the Court
reiterated its position that the assessment of punitive damages
is not a fact, unlike the measure of actual or compensatory
damages suffered. 4 Therefore, the Court reasoned, the Seventh
Amendment was not implicated in this context.95 However, the
Court conceded that while "the jury's award of punitive
damages did not constitute a finding of fact," it is indeed a
"fact-sensitive undertaking."96
Second, Leatherman pointed out that historically, the
assessment of punitive damages has always been the distinct
function of the jury.97 In Day v. Woodworth,9" the earliest
Supreme Court case to mention punitive damages, the Court
89 Id. (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697-98).
90 Id. at 437.
9 Id. The full text of the Seventh Amendment is as follows:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Fairmont Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474, 481
(1933) ("The rule that this Court will not review the action of a federal trial court in
granting or denying a motion for a new trial for error of fact has been settled by a long
and unbroken line of decisions; and has been frequently applied where the ground of
the motion was that damages awarded by the jury were excessive or were inadequate.")
(emphasis added); S. Ry.-Carolina Div. v. Bennett, 233 U.S. 80, 87 (1914) ("[A] case of
mere excess upon the evidence is a matter to be dealt with by the trial court ... it does
not present a question for re-examination."); Wabash Ry. Co. v. McDaniels, 107 U.S.
454, 456 (1883) ("That we are without authority to disturb the judgment upon the
ground that the damages are excessive cannot be doubted. Whether the order
overruling the motion for new trial ... was erroneous or not, our power is restricted to
the determination of questions of law arising upon the record.").
93 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 437; U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
94 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 437.
96 Id.
96 Id. at 437 n.il.
' Id. at 437.
98 54 U.S. 363 (1851).
[Vol. 68: 3
2003] A WRONG TURN ON THE ROAD TO TORT REFORM 897
observed that the measure of punitive damages should be "left
to the discretion of the jury."99 But the Cooper majority
countered by reasoning that punitive damages have "evolved"
since the nineteenth century. 1°° Because many forms of
intangible injuries were not thought to fit within the narrow
scope of compensatory damages, juries often awarded punitive
damages for injuries that currently would fall under pain and
suffering, or other forms of compensable assessment. 1
Therefore, as the categories of compensatory damages widened,
"the theory behind punitive damages has shifted towards a
more purely punitive (and therefore less factual)
understanding. ,1
02
Third, Leatherman argued that the deterrent function
of punitive damages might suggest that the jury's assessment
is a fact within the meaning of the Seventh Amendment. 103 For
example, Leatherman pointed out that "[siome scholars ...
assert that punitive damages should be used to compensate for
the underdeterrence of unlawful behavior that will result from
a defendant's evasion of liability."104 The Court responded by
reasoning that juries do not usually engage in this type of
sophisticated deterrence analysis when determining the
amount of punitive damages to award."5 Moreover, the Court
noted, deterrence is only one of the many factors that a jury
considers when assessing a punitive damages award.0 6
Id. at 371, quoted in Cooper, 532 U.S. at 437.
100 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 437.
'o' Id. at 437.




'o' Cooper, U.S. 532 at 437. To reinforce this proposition, the Court cited a
study by Cass Sunstein from the Journal of Legal Studies. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Do
People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 237 (2000). However, Sunstein's
study found that people do not normally engage in "optimal deterrence." Optimal
deterrence entails adjusting the amount of damages a defendant must pay depending
on the likelihood that the defendant's conduct would be detected. Considering that
optimal deterrence is a "central claim in the economic analysis of law" and "second
nature for those who study deterrence questions," it is hardly surprising that a jury
does not engage in this level of economic analysis when assessing a punitive damages
award. Id. at 239. The Sunstein study specifically noted that people do indeed think
about deterrence when awarding punitive damages, they just do not "attempt to
promote optimal deterrence." Id. at 241.
10 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 439-40.
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Next, the Court considered the practical implications of
imposing a de novo standard of review on the appellate
courts."' The Court found that institutional competence
concerns did not "tip the balance in favor of deferential
appellate review." °8  Taking each of the BMW factors
individually, the Court stated that trial judges have only a
"somewhat" superior advantage over appellate courts in
analyzing the first factor, the degree of the defendant's
reprehensibility. 9 Moreover, that advantage only exists in
regard to issues turning on witness credibility and demeanor.10
The Court found that trial and appellate courts were equally
capable of analyzing the second factor, the disparity between
the harm or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the
punitive damages award."' And finally, the Court noted that
the third factor, the difference between the punitive damages
awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or
imposed in comparable cases, was more "suited to the expertise
of appellate courts" because it involves "broad legal
comparison. ""
The Court then engaged in its own de novo review of the
district court's rejection of Cooper's due process challenge to
the punitive damages award."3 Although observing that the de
novo standard of review will likely affect the result "in only a
relatively small number of cases," the Court noted that de novo
review in this case might have led the Ninth Circuit to reach a
different result.'14 The Court found that its consideration of the
"' Id. at 435-36.
108 Id. at 440. It is hard to see how the Court reached this conclusion after it
specifically pointed out that although appellate courts are better at applying the third
BMW factor, district courts are better at applying the first BMW factor. Moreover, both
are equally capable of applying the second BMW factor. Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 440.
... Cooper, 532 U.S. at 440.
112 Id.
1' Id. at 441.
11 Id. By the Court's own admission, if de novo review will only affect the
result in a small number of cases, one wonders why the Court would bother to adopt
the change. A possible answer can be found in the Cooper oral arguments, in an
exchange between Justice Breyer and William Bradford Reynolds, attorney for Cooper:
Justice Breyer: And I think you're saying that if you have de novo review,
you're simply going to have more articulations by appellate courts of the way
trial courts ought to look at jury verdicts . . . you're saying what ought to
happen in the development of the review of punitive damages is the same
thing that I think happened back in the old days in the review of jury verdicts
of negligence. If you go back in law reports to the twenties and the thirties
when negligence law was developing, you find exhaustive appellate
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three BMW factors "reveal[ed] a series of questionable
conclusions by the District Court that may not survive de novo
review."" 5 In analyzing the first factor, the Court pointed out
that the jury had been "guided by instructions that
characterized the deliberate copying of the PST as wrongful."16
Part of the punitive damages award, therefore, might have
been assessed with the thought to deter this "unlawful" type of
behavior in the future."7 However, since the Ninth Circuit
determined that Cooper's copying was not unlawful, knowledge
of the Ninth Circuit's position might have seriously
undermined the jury's assessment of the degree of Cooper's
reprehensibility. 8
In evaluating the second factor, the Court noted that
incorrectly calculating the potential harm that Cooper's actions
caused Leatherman may have influenced the district court."9
Indeed, Leatherman calculated its potential harm by arguing
that Cooper "anticipated 'gross profits of approximately $3
million dollars during the first five years of sales.""2 But, the
Court noted, even if this were true, it was unreasonable to
assume that all of Cooper's ToolZall sales were attributable to
its use of a modified PST in promotional materials. 2' Moreover,
"as the Court of Appeals [previously] pointed out, the picture of
the [modified] PST did not misrepresent the features of the
original ToolZall and could not have deceived potential
discussions of whether, you know, the train was close enough to the
intersection for the driver to have been negligent in going out on the tracks
and so on....
Mr. Reynolds: That is fair, Justice Breyer. I do think that ....
Justice Breyer: I agree. I agree ... the value is not only in the substantive
standard, the value is in the application of that standard in sort of developed
appellate discussions.
Oral Argument, Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 2001 WL 209808, at
*15 (Feb. 26, 2001) (No. 99-2035).
However, as this Comment points out, appellate courts only hear a
miniscule number of constitutional excessiveness appeals, certainly not enough to
develop a solid body of case law. Moreover, abuse of discretion review is already applied
in a rigorous and well-developed manner by appellate courts in reviewing punitive
excessiveness. See discussion infra Parts IIB, III.B.




"1 Id. at 441-42.
120 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 442 (citing Respondent's Brief at 7, Cooper Indus. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001) (No. 99-2035)).
121 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 442.
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customers in any significant way."'22 Therefore, the Court
concluded, Cooper's wrongdoing would certainly not be the
chief cause of its sales volume for a five-year period.2 '
In regard to the third BMW factor, the Court again
found fault with the district court's evaluation of the civil
penalties awarded in comparable cases.'24 At trial, Leatherman
argued that Cooper would have been subject to a civil penalty
of up to $25,000 for each advertising violation under Oregon's
Unlawful Trade Practices Act.'25 The district court agreed with
Leatherman, finding that each individual piece of promotional
material Cooper distributed at the trade show and to its sales
force throughout the world, represented separate violations
under the Act.'26 Nevertheless, the majority sided with Cooper,
holding that the company's use of a single mock-up of the PST
in all of its promotional material resulted in only one violation
of the Act. 1
27
Finally, the Court stated that it applied the BMW
guideposts to this particular case not to "pre-judge" whether




125 Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 646.642(3) (1997)).
126 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 442.
127 Id. at 443.
128 Id. Not surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit reduced Leatherman's punitive
award upon remand. The Court of Appeal's opinion essentially echoed the Supreme
Court's analysis in Cooper. It is interesting to note, however, that the Ninth Circuit
had an extremely difficult time figuring out the proper amount of award reduction.
Referring to its new role as "not an enviable task," the appeals court "searched vainly
... for a formula" to assist its deliberations. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper
Indus., 285 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2002). In the end, the appeals court simply had to
rely on "its combined experience and judgment" to reach a figure of $500,000. Id. As
illustrated by the Ninth Circuit's new role as the final arbiter of the punitive damages
award in this case, one of the effects of de novo review will be a shift of power away
from trial judges and toward the appellate courts. One of the more interesting
criticisms of the power shift inherent with the use of de novo review was articulated by
Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham in O'Bryan v. Estelle:
When an appellate court starts afresh, a trial court's function is reduced to
that of collecting data and providing an opportunity for an extrajudicial
resolution of the dispute. Even this function would experience a reduction in
value as expectation of a judicial decision of consequence shifts wholly away
from the trial court. The pyramidal shape of our present court structure rests
on the institutional integrity of the trial court as a distinct part of the justice
system. As such review is extended upward, only the last "court" in the chain
retains full institutional integrity. More is afoot here than nostalgic or
romantic reverence for trial courts. Finality and all values bound up in that
precept are implicated.
714 F.2d 365, 392 (5th Cir. 1983) (Higginbotham, J., concurring). See also William V.
Dorsaneo, III, Reexaming the Right to Trial by Jury, 54 SMU L. REV. 1695, 1733 (2001)
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rather, to illustrate that the answer may hinge on the
application of a de novo standard of review. 2 ' Therefore, the
Court concluded, the judgment should be vacated and the case
remanded for further proceedings utilizing a de novo standard
of review. 131
Justices Scalia and Thomas both concurred, the former
in judgment only. Justice Thomas reiterated his belief "that the
Constitution does not constrain the size of [a] punitive damages
award" and voiced his wish to overrule BMW.131 However, he
conceded, Cooper did not present the desired opportunity, and
because he agreed that de novo was the correct standard of
review, he joined in the opinion of the Court. 13 Justice Scalia
also restated his belief that excessive punitive damages do not
implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 3 Moreover, citing his dissent in Ornelas v.
United States,"4 Scalia reasserted his view that mixed
constitutional questions of law and fact should not be reviewed
de novo. 131 These mixed questions, Scalia noted, resist
"meaningful generalization" and therefore are more conducive
to review under an abuse of discretion standard. 136 However,
adhering to the previous decisions of the Court, Scalia felt that
de novo review best accorded with precedent.
37
C. The Dissent
As the sole dissenter, Justice Ginsburg argued against
the adoption of a de novo standard of review. 13 Ginsburg noted
that in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,"' the Court
("The characterization of the issue of [punitive] excessiveness as a purely legal question
has the effect of removing the locus of decision-making away from juries and trial
judges and toward appellate courts.").
9 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 443.
130 Id.
131 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
132 Id.
1 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
134 517 U.S. 690 (1996).
135 Id. In his Ornelas dissent, Justice Scalia argued that "with respect to the
questions at issue here, the purpose of the determination and its extremely fact-bound
nature will cause de novo review to have relatively little benefit, it is in my view
unwise to require courts of appeals to undertake the searching inquiry that standard
requires." Id. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 443-44.
137 Id. at 444.
13 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
139 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
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held that appellate review of a district court's refusal to set
aside a jury verdict as excessive did not implicate the Seventh
Amendment only if such relief was limited to abuse of
discretion. 4 ' Although Gasperini involved an award of
compensatory damages, Ginsburg argued that the reasoning in
that case applied equally to punitive damages.' Moreover,
Ginsburg noted, the task of determining punitive damages has
historically been consigned to the sole discretion of the jury.
4 2
Justice Ginsburg then observed that although an award
of punitive damages "involves more than the resolution of
matters of historical or predictive fact,"'43 a jury's verdict is
nonetheless predicated on determinations that the Court has
characterized as "factfindings."144 Ginsburg analogized punitive
damages to compensatory damages for intangible, non-
economic injuries because "[bloth derive their meaning from a
set of underlying facts as determined by a jury.
145
Consequently, "[o]ne million dollars' worth of pain and
suffering does not exist as a 'fact' in the world any more or less
than one million dollars' worth of moral outrage."46
Next, Ginsburg argued that an abuse of discretion
standard was simply more practical than de novo review,
because district courts have a superior advantage over
appellate courts in assessing the first BMW factor, the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.' District courts
140 Id. Indeed, the Court in Gasperini specifically noted that
[w]ithin the federal system, practical reasons combine with Seventh
Amendment constraints to lodge in the district court, not the court of appeals,
primary responsibility for application of [an excessiveness review]. Trial
judges have the unique opportunity to consider the evidence in the living
courtroom context while appellate judges only see the cold paper record.
Id. at 438. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Gasperini Court also
observed that "appellate review of a federal trial court's denial of a motion to set aside
a jury's verdict as excessive is a relatively late, and less secure, development." Id. at
434.
1 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 445.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 446.
1 Id. These factfindings include: "the extent of harm or potential harm
caused by the defendant's misconduct, whether the defendant acted in good faith,
whether the misconduct was an individual instance or part of a broader pattern, [and]
whether the defendant behaved negligently, recklessly, or maliciously." Id.
145 Id.
146 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 446. As Ginsburg noted, both pain and suffering and
punitive damages "derive their meaning from a set of underlying facts as determined
by a jury. If one exercise in quantification is properly regarded as factfinding, it seems
to me the other should be so regarded as well." Id. at 446-47 (internal citation omitted).
147 Id. at 448. Ginsburg pointed out that the Court in BMW had identified this
first factor as being the "most important" in assessing the reasonableness of a punitive
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can more easily assess the first factor because they view the
evidence "not on a cold paper record but in the living courtroom
context."'48 Moreover, Ginsburg also believed that district
courts were better equipped to evaluate the second BMW
factor, the relationship between the plaintiffs harm and the
punitive damages award, especially in cases involving
"intangible injury."' Finally, Ginsburg noted that there
probably would be little variance in the outcomes between
abuse of discretion and de novo review. 5 ' With so few benefits
to changing the standard of review, Ginsburg found that abuse
of discretion "hews more closely to 'the strictures of the
Seventh Amendment' and, therefore, was the better choice. 5 '
II. ABUSE OF DISCRETION IS THE CORRECT STANDARD FOR
REVIEWING DETERMINATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PUNITIVE EXCESSIVENESS
The determination of whether a punitive damages
award is unconstitutional is essentially a mixed question of law
and fact. 5 ' This is because it involves applying a "legal"
standard, the BMW factors, to the specific factual findings of a
case. '53 As Justice Scalia noted in his Cooper concurrence, the
"question of [the] excessiveness of punitive damages ... [is a]
fact-bound constitutional issue." '54 Moreover, the majority in
Cooper called the assessment of punitive damages "fact-
damages award. Id. at 449.
148 Id. at 448 (internal citations omitted).
149 Id. at 449.
150 Id. Ginsburg reasoned that "in the typical case envisioned by [the BMW
decision], where reasonableness is primarily tied to reprehensibility, an appellate court
should have infrequent occasion to reverse." Id. at 449.
15' Cooper, 532 U.S. at 450 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal
Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 280 n.26 (1989)). Ginsburg observed that although appellate courts
review determinations of reasonable suspicion, probable cause and the excessiveness of
criminal forfeitures under a de novo standard, these determinations "typically are
made without jury involvement." Id. at 448 n. 1.
152 See cases cited supra note 29.
15 In the Cooper oral argument before the Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor
asked William Bradford Reynolds, attorney for Cooper, how he would characterize the
determination of constitutional punitive excessiveness. Mr. Reynolds responded, "I
think it could be characterized as a mixed question of fact and law in that, as I
understand what it means, it means that if you have established facts, and you're
applying a legal principle to those facts, that would be a mixed question of fact and
law." Oral Argument, Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 2001 WL 209808,
at *6 (Feb. 26, 2001) (No. 99-2035).
'5 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 444 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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sensitive" 5 and compared determinations of excessive punitive
damages to determinations of reasonable suspicion and
probable cause, both "mixed-questions of law and fact."
15 6
Typically, in the federal system, appellate courts review factual
findings for clear error and questions of law under a de novo
standard."7 Mixed determinations of law and fact, however, fall
into a judicial no-man's land, resulting in the Court adopting
either an abuse of discretion review or a de novo review,
depending upon the issue in question.5 Indeed, the Supreme
Court in Miller v. Fenton... articulated a test for deciding the
correct standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact
as one of "the sound administration of justice."160 The Court
reasoned that the correct standard depends on whether one
"judicial actor" is in a better position to decide the issue in
question. 6' Thus, issues based on the "credibility, of a witness"
and involve "evaluation of demeanor" are better suited to
deferential review by appellate courts.'62 Whereas issues that
acquire their meaning only through application would best be
given de novo review by appellate courts to clarify the legal
principles. 6 ' According to the Miller test, some-but not all-
mixed questions of law and fact should receive de novo review.
The determination of the constitutional excessiveness of
a punitive damages award should not be reviewed under a de
novo standard. First, appellate courts are not better positioned
than district courts to apply the BMW factors. This is
particularly true of the first BMW factor, the degree of
155 Id. at 437 n.1l.
16 Id. at 436.
... FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a); see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558
(1988) ("For purposes of standard of review, decisions by judges are traditionally
divided into three categories, denominated questions of law[,] reviewable de novo,
questions of fact[,] reviewable for clear error, and matters of discretion[,] reviewable for
abuse of discretion.") (internal quotations and parenthesis omitted); Michael R. Bosse,
Standards of Review: The Meaning of Words, 49 ME. L. REV. 368, 370-71 (1997)
("Standards of review are widely understood to be based on whether the issue is one of
'fact' or 'law.' If an issue is deemed one of 'fact,' a court generally will review it only for
clear error. If an issue is deemed one of'law,' a court will exercise a de novo review.").
158 See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996); Koon v. United
States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990);
Pierce, 487 U.S. 552; Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985); Pullman-Standard v. Swint,
456 U.S. 273 (1982).
159 474 U.S. 104.
"0 Id. at 114.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 114-15.
1 Id. at 114.
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reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, which is much
more discernable in a living courtroom context than from the
cold record at the appellate level. And as the Court specifically
noted in BMW, this first guidepost is "[p]erhaps the most
important indicium."'64 Second, the assessment of punitive
damages is based upon the specific facts of each particular
case.'65 Therefore, de novo review by appellate courts of these
fact-intensive findings will not help to clarify the larger
doctrine of punitive damages.'66 Moreover, contrary to the
Court's reasoning in Cooper, because a punitive damages
award is inexorably tied to the specific facts of each case, one
case will rarely serve as useful precedent for subsequent cases.
Thus, there is simply no reason to depart from the traditional
abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a district court's
determinations of constitutionally excessive punitive damages.
A. Trial Judges are Better Positioned to Apply the BMW
Factors
District courts are simply better positioned to apply the
BMW factors than are appellate courts. Although the majority
in Cooper surmised that "considerations of institutional
competence . . .fail to tip the balance in favor of deferential
review," this proved untrue, even under the Court's own
analysis.6 v Indeed, the Cooper Court found that while appellate
courts were better suited to apply the third BMW guidepost,
district courts were more capable of applying the first.'
Moreover, the Court held that both courts were "equally
capable" of applying the second BMW guidepost.9 Therefore, it
is unclear why the majority concluded that appellate courts
164 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
165 The Cooper Court acknowledged that the assessment of punitive damages
was a "fact-sensitive undertaking." Cooper, 532 U.S. at 437 n.l. See also Day v.
Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851) ("[T]he degree of punishment to be thus inflicted
[i.e., punitive damages] must depend on the peculiar circumstances of each case.").
166 Justice Scalia argued in his dissent in Ornelas v. United States that
because determinations of probable cause and reasonable suspicion were mired in
factual settings, de novo review of these issues would not help to clarify the law. Scalia
argued this is primarily because "[1]aw clarification requires generalization, and some
issues lend themselves to generalization much more than others." Ornelas, 517 U.S. at
703 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Similar to determinations of probable cause and reasonable
suspicion, the fact-based assessment of punitive damages will not lend itself to the
generalization necessary to clarify the law.




were more competent to apply the test. Under the Court's own
analysis, appellate courts do not possess any greater expertise
than the district courts in applying the BMW factors.
First, as the majority in Cooper conceded, district courts
have a "superior advantage" over appellate courts in applying
the first BMW factor, the degree of reprehensibility of a
defendant's conduct. 170 This is primarily because the
reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct is closely tied to
witness demeanor and credibility. Essentially, a trial judge can
make first-hand assessments from the bench as to whether a
defendant has acted in good faith or attempted to conceal a
material fact. And these assessments are key to measuring the
degree of a defendant's misconduct. 171 In contrast, an appellate
court must rely on the "cold paper record" and is unable to
replicate the insight and personal knowledge that is garnered
at a "living" trial. '72 Indeed, as the Court stated in Miller,
"[wihen ... the issue involves the credibility of witnesses and
therefore turns largely on an evaluation of demeanor, there are
compelling and familiar justifications for leaving the process of
applying law to fact to the trial court and according its
determinations presumptive weight."173
Second, the majority in Cooper stated that district
courts and appellate courts were "equally capable" of applying
the second BMW factor, the difference between the punitive
damages award and the harm or potential harm suffered by the
plaintiff.'74 However, as Justice Ginsburg noted in her Cooper
dissent, in cases involving "intangible injury," district courts
are better equipped to measure the harm.7 1 It is easy to see
how this rings true if one considers an intangible injury such as
loss of enjoyment of life. 76 Similar to a defendant's degree of
170 Id.
171 As Leatherman argued in its brief,
[here, [Cooper's] intent and (alleged) good faith was central to the
reprehensibility issue. The trial judge, having seen and heard the witnesses
testify and be cross-examined, is obviously better able to discern the
defendant's state of mind, evaluate demeanor and credibility and resolve the
factual disputes upon which application of the BMW guideposts depends.
Brief of Respondent at 35.
171 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 445 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
173 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985).
114 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 440.
171 Id. at 449 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
176 The claim of loss of enjoyment of life compensates a victim for the
limitations on his life created by his injury. See Tina M. Tabacchi, Note, Hedonic
Damages, A New Trend in Compensation?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 331 (1991).
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reprehensibility, a plaintiffs claim of this injury would turn
primarily on her and other witnesses' credibility and demeanor
at trial.177 Therefore, a district judge's direct observations at the
trial level would prove far more useful in reviewing the amount
of intangible harm suffered by the plaintiff than would an
appellate court's distant perspective.
Third, if appellate courts do indeed possess any special
advantage, it is only in applying the third BMW factor, a
comparison of a punitive damages award to other civil
penalties. As the majority noted in Cooper, "the broad legal
comparison" necessary for the third BMW factor "seems more
suited to the expertise of appellate courts."178 However, it is
difficult to see why the ability to more effectively apply one out
of three BMW guideposts "tips the scale"179 in favor of de novo
appellate review. Especially in light of the fact that district
courts are better situated to apply the first and "most
important"8 ° BMW guidepost, the Court's conclusion is
untenable.
Finally, district courts have a general institutional
advantage over appellate courts in determining constitutional
excessiveness because they simply see more cases involving
punitive damages. In fact, district courts handle more civil tort
cases and make more determinations regarding the
constitutional excessiveness of punitive damages awards then
do appellate courts. 8' Indeed, in Koon v. United States,"2 the
Court held that a district court's determination of whether to
depart from sentencing guidelines should be reviewed for abuse
177 For example, in the case of Isgett v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., the plaintiff
brought a claim for loss of enjoyment of life. In upholding his claim, the court stated:
In addition to the physical loss, expense, pain, suffering and incidental costs,
the late plaintiff suffered from anxiety, frustration and the sure and certain
knowledge of his incapacity along with the mental anguish described by his
family. From a life of usefulness, enjoyment and acceptance he was
transposed to a life of almost complete dependence. The insidious disease
that was awakened by his injuries took charge of his physical body with
attendant results on his nervous system.
Isgett v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 332 F. Supp. 1127, 1138 (D.S.C. 1971).
Both the plaintiffs testimony and that of his family were key to the court's
assessment of the plaintiffs intangible injuries. As the trial court noted, the "court
recognizes the difficulty of passing on the issue of credibility on a cold record, such as a
deposition, and his [plaintiffs] testimony, to this trial court, has the ring of truth." Id.
at 1137.
178 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 440.
179 Id.
1 0 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
"' Brief of Respondent at 36.
182 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
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of discretion because district courts "see so many more
Guidelines cases than appellate courts."'83 The Court in Koon
reasoned that a "district court's special competence" with
regard to the "ordinariness" or "unusualness" of a case is an
"important source of information," as are "the reactions of the
trial judge to the fact-specific circumstances of the case."184 The
Court's reasoning in Koon is equally applicable to a trial judge's
determinations regarding constitutional excessiveness. Since
trial judges see more cases involving punitive damages, they
are better positioned to assess the distinct facts in each case.
In conclusion, appellate courts have no expertise or
knowledge that would give them an advantage over district
courts in determining whether a punitive damages award is
unconstitutional. To the contrary, district courts possess
special expertise in applying both the first and second BMW
guideposts. Finally, because district courts see more civil cases
and are more familiar with punitive damage assessments, they
are in a better position to make determinations of
constitutional excessiveness.
B. De Novo Review Will Not Clarify the Law or Unify
Precedent
De novo appellate review of a district court's
determinations of constitutional excessiveness will not help to
further clarify the doctrine of punitive damages. This is
primarily because a jury's assessment of punitive damages is
predicated upon a host of factual findings that are particular to
each case."8 5 For example, the jury in Cooper considered the
following four factors when they determined the appropriate
amount of punitive damages to award: (1) the character of
Cooper's conduct that gave rise to Leatherman's unfair
competition claims; (2) Cooper's motive; (3) the sum of money
that was required to discourage Cooper and others from
engaging in such conduct in the future; and (4) Cooper's income
and assets.186 A jury's consideration of these factors depends
upon a finding of specific facts, which form the kaleidoscope
through which appellate judges will look when applying the
BMW guideposts. Therefore, any decision regarding
183 Id. at 98.
184 Id. at 99.
'85 See cases cited supra note 92 and accompanying text.
'" Cooper, 532 U.S. at 439 n.12.
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constitutional excessiveness will be colored by these facts and
provide little opportunity for the generalizations that are
necessary to clarify an area of law or serve as useful precedent.
In prior decisions, the Court also recognized the
inherent difficulty in utilizing fact-based legal standards to
clarify the law. For example, in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp.,187 the Court held that a trial judge's determinations in a
Rule 11 proceeding must be reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard.' Rule 11 proceedings center around
whether or not an attorney had a "substantial good-faith basis"
for believing that a complaint was grounded in fact and legally
tenable. 9 These determinations, the Court noted, require a
court to consider "legal questions rooted in factual
determinations."9 ' Therefore, "an appellate court's review of
[these determinations] is unlikely to establish clear guidelines
for lower courts ... nor will it clarify the underlying principles
of law." Likewise, in Pierce v. Underwood,' the Court held that
a district court's determination of whether the "position of the
United States was substantially justified" under the Equal
Access to Justice Act... must be reviewed for abuse of
discretion.9 ' Again, the Court held that this determination has
a basis in both "law and fact" and involves consideration of
unique factors that are "little susceptible . . . of useful
generalization."94
In addition, an appellate court's de novo review of a
punitive damages award for constitutional excessiveness will
rarely serve as useful precedent for subsequent cases. Again,
because the punitive damages award itself is a product of
multiple, unique facts and circumstances a jury considers, one
award is seldom relevant or helpful in comparison to another.9
187 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
188 Id.
189 Id. at 398-99; FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
190 Hartmarx, 496 U.S. at 401.
191 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
19 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2000).
193 Pierce, 487 U.S. at 562.
194 Id.
195 Justice Scalia made this same point in his Ornelas dissent, arguing that
determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause are too fact-specific to serve
as useful precedent. Scalia noted:
The facts of this very case [Ornelas] illustrate the futility of attempting to
craft useful precedent from the fact-intensive review demanded by
determinations of probable cause and reasonable suspicion. On remand, in
conducting de novo review, the Seventh Circuit might consider, inter alia, the
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Indeed, the Court itself endorsed this proposition, most notably
in TXO where the plurality stated that
[s]uch [punitive damages] awards are the product of numerous, and
sometimes intangible factors; a jury imposing a punitive damages
award must make a qualitative assessment based on a host of facts
and circumstances unique to the particular case before it. Because
no two cases are truly identical, meaningful comparisons of such
awards are difficult to make.
196
Even Justice O'Connor, arguing for the application of a
constitutional test in TXO admitted that "[blecause no two
[punitive damages] cases are alike, not all comparisons will be
enlightening."'97 Similarly, the Hartmarx Court noted that
"[flact-bound resolutions cannot be made uniform through
appellate review, de novo or otherwise."98
The Cooper majority, however, analogized
determinations of constitutional punitive excessiveness to
criminal law determinations of probable cause and reasonable
suspicion.' Relying on Ornelas v. United States,"' a case that
supported de novo review of both determinations, the Cooper
majority decided that the underlying reasoning from the
criminal law was more applicable to punitive damages."' The
following factors relevant to its determination whether there was probable
cause to conduct a warrantless search and reasonable suspicion justifying the
investigatory stop: (i) the two NADDIS tips; (ii) that the car was a 1981 two-
door General Motors product; (iii) that the car was from California, a source
State; (iv) that the car was in Milwaukee; (v) that it was December; (vi) that
one suspect checked into the hotel at 4 a.m.; (vii) that he did not have
reservations; (viii) that he had one traveling companion; (ix) that one suspect
appeared calm but shaking; and (x) that there was a loose panel in the car
door. If the Seventh Circuit were to find that this unique confluence of factors
supported probable cause and reasonable suspicion, the absence of any one of
these factors in the next case would render the precedent inapplicable.
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 703-04 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). This
reasoning applies equally well to the review of punitive damages.
19' TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 457 (1993). Justice
Kennedy also noted in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 41
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) that "[tihese features of the jury
system for assessing punitive damages discourage uniform results."
... TXO, 509 U.S. at 483 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
198 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 402 (1990) (citing Mars
Steel Corp. v. Cont'l Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 936 (1989)).
' Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001).
200 517 U.S. 690.
201 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 436. However, as Leatherman argued in its brief,
"while in some circumstances the courts of appeals play the principal role in ensuring
the uniform application of legal rules to particular sets of facts, see, e.g., Ornelas v.
United States, ... the application of the BMW guideposts is not such a situation." Brief
of Respondent at 35-36. This is because with punitive damages, the question "is ...
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Court found that these three types of determinations are "fluid
concepts" and "take their substantive content from the
particular contexts in which the standards are being
assessed."20 2 Therefore, the Court reasoned, all "acquire more
meaningful content through case-by-case application at the
appellate level.""3 The Court's argument, however, ignores the
fact-intensive inquiry underlying the assessment of punitive
damages, probable cause and reasonable suspicion. Indeed, as
Justice Scalia's dissent in Ornelas correctly points out, "[1]aw
clarification requires generalization," and it is exactly because
concepts like reasonable suspicion and probable cause cannot
be "reduced to a neat set of legal rules that they will be
ultimately resistant to generalization."0 4
Moreover, the Court's analogy of constitutional punitive
excessiveness to these two criminal law determinations is
misguided. This is primarily because a determination of
probable cause or reasonable suspicion involves a judicial
review of an individual's reasons for acting before a legal
proceeding, namely, whether a police officer was correct in
arresting a defendant. A review of punitive damages, however,
involves a judicial review of the appropriateness of a
punishment after a legal proceeding. Thus, there is an
analytical disconnect between analogizing a justification for a
particular action with the appropriateness of a punishment
after said action. Indeed, if there is any common ground at all,
it is merely that all three determinations involve some form of
judicial review.
Furthermore, although the Court in Cooper
characterized punitive damages as "quasi-criminal,"2 5 they are
still awarded under the umbrella of civil tort law. In fact, an
award of punitive damages does not implicate the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy, and a
defendant can be criminally prosecuted and incur punitive
damages in a civil trial for the same offense. 6 Also, a jury does
whether the judgment entered by the trial court falls within the zone of
reasonableness." Id. at 34.
2 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 436 (citing Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696).
203 Id.
204 Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
205 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 432 (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1,
54 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 (1989) (holding that the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not apply to punitive damages in
cases between private parties).
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not determine reasonable suspicion and probable cause in
criminal law, but does determine punitive damages in civil
law.2"7 Therefore, the more fitting analogy for punitive damages
is the Court's past precedents involving civil law
determinations, such as those in Hartmarx and Pierce, both of
which the Court reviewed for abuse of discretion.2 8
In addition, even if de novo review could help to clarify
the doctrine of punitive damages, appellate courts hear too few
cases to foster a useful body of well-developed appellate
discussions.2 9 This is primarily because appellate courts hear
only a miniscule number of punitive constitutional appeals
each year.210 Irrespective of the dearth of constitutional
punitive appeals, however, the traditional abuse of discretion
standard still provides adequate clarification and articulation
of the BMW factors at the appellate level. In fact, the Ninth
Circuit in Cooper specifically articulated its application of the
BMW factors under the abuse of discretion standard.21' The
Ninth Circuit further explained its reasoning for upholding the
punitive damages award by noting that "Cooper did not act
promptly to remedy the problem even after an injunction
issued" and that Cooper's passing off, although not
"traditional," gave it an "unfair advantage."
212
207 Justice Ginsburg pointed this out in her Cooper dissent: "Such
determinations [reasonable suspicion and probable cause] typically are made without
jury involvement." Cooper, 532 U.S. at 448 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The
assessment of punitive damages, however, "has [always been] left to the discretion of
the jury." Id. at 445 (citing Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1852)).
208 See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990) (holding
that a trial judge's determinations on Rule 11 motions must be reviewed for abuse of
discretion); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 562 (1988) (holding that whether the
position of the United States is substantially justified under the Equal Access to
Justice Act must be reviewed for abuse of discretion).
209 As Leatherman pointed out in its brief, "[blurdening Courts of Appeals
with de novo review will make it even more difficult for them to craft well-written
opinions articulating the courts' reasoning and contributing to the development of the
law." Brief of Respondent at 38.
210 See Rustad, supra note 31, at 40 (noting that federal appellate courts have
heard only eleven appeals regarding punitive excessiveness since the Court's decision
in BMW). Indeed, at the time the Court decided Cooper, federal appellate courts had
heard only heard nineteen appeals challenging the constitutionality of a punitive
damages award over $1 million within the past six years. Brief of Respondent at 37.
211 Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Nos. 98-35147, 98-35415,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 33657, at *4-5 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 1999).
212 Id. at *5.
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In sum, a jury's assessment of punitive damages is
based on unique, case-specific facts, and those facts are
interwoven with the BMW factors. A legal standard based on
fact-intensive inquiries will resist both generalizations and
uniformity in outcome. Moreover, appellate courts do not hear
enough punitive appeals to foster a range of discussion or a
useful body of precedent. Consequently, plenary appellate
review of a district court's determinations of constitutional
excessiveness will neither clarify the doctrine of punitive
damages nor unify precedent.
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH DE Novo REVIEW
Aside from concerns of institutional competence, there
are problems inherent in the use of de novo review. De novo
review will be extremely complicated to administer without
providing significantly different results than are already found
under an abuse of discretion standard.13 Moreover, there is no
reason to over-burden appellate judges with de novo review
when abuse of discretion is adequate to reduce a
constitutionally excessive punitive damages award,214 especially
as appellate judges' workloads have risen dramatically over the
years.1 5 Indeed, the burdens of de novo review will outweigh
considerably its minimal benefits.
First, as Justice Ginsburg noted in her Cooper dissent,
de novo review will be "more complex" and "challenging to
administer." 6 Appellate courts will have to distinguish
between a multitude of claims on appeal in order to apply the
correct standard of review. Perhaps most confusing, however,
appellate judges will have to differentiate between common law
claims of punitive excessiveness, which must be reviewed for
abuse of discretion and constitutional claims of punitive
excessiveness, which must now be reviewed de novo.1 7 Second,
in actual practice, abuse of discretion has proved more than
213 See Cooper, 532 U.S. at 445 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
114 See Rustad, supra note 31, at 40 n.152 (finding that out of the eleven
appeals regarding excessive punitive damages that federal appellate courts have heard
since BMW, eight were remanded or vacated).
215 See Brief of Respondent at 37. See also COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL
ALTERNATWVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, Final Report, Dec. 18, 1998,
submitted to the President & the Congress pursuant to Pub. L. No. 105-119 at 14
("[Slince 1960, circuit judgeships have grown roughly by 160%, but appeals per
judgeship have grown by 450%.").
216 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 445 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
217 See id. at 446.
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sufficient in providing a rigorous post-verdict check on
excessive punitive damages. 18 Indeed, application of de novo
review will rarely result in more reductions of punitive
damages awards than abuse of discretion. According to a 1998
Wisconsin Law Review article by Professor Michael L. Rustad,
federal appellate courts heard eleven appeals regarding the
excessiveness of punitive damages since the Court's 1996
decision in BMW.219 Out of those eleven awards, the appeals
courts remanded or reversed eight under an abuse of discretion
review."0 In addition, various studies of punitive damages,
while differing in opinion as to the frequency of these awards,
have all found one thing in common: there is extensive post-
trial oversight by both trial and appellate judges in reducing
punitive damages awards.22" '
A. De Novo Review Will Be Confusing to Apply
First, de novo review will be confusing to apply, as it
will result in varying standards of review within the same
appeal. Constitutional punitive excessiveness appeals generally
arise within a Rule 59 motion.222 However, such motions often
encompass a variety of other grounds for a new trial, such as
juror misconduct or newly discovered evidence.23 An appellate
judge will have to differentiate between these claims and apply
different standards of review. Moreover, since the Cooper Court
held that common law claims of punitive excessiveness must be
reviewed for abuse of discretion and constitutional punitive
excessiveness must be reviewed de novo, appellate judges will
be in the awkward position of having to distinguish between
two similar claims.224 Indeed, the factors underlying a common
law claim of excessiveness most likely will overlap with those
218 See generally Rustad, supra note 31.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id. In his article, Rustad compared various studies of punitive damages
awards and found that "[a]ll of the studies examining post-verdict adjustments confirm
that punitive damages are strictly scrutinized by trial and appellate judges." Id. at 41.
222 A Rule 59 motion is a motion for a new trial or remittitur. The most
common grounds for relief under this motion are excessive damages, verdicts against
the clear weight of evidence or an unfair trial. 12 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 59.13 (3d ed. 1997).
223 Id.
224 See Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 450
(2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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underlying a constitutional claim of excessiveness.225  In
addition, as Justice Ginsburg noted in her Cooper dissent,
appellate courts also will have to distinguish a district court's
findings of historical fact, which may be reviewed only for
"clear error."2 Adding to the complexity of this review is the
uncertainty of the correct standard to be applied in cases where
a state has adopted a scheme confining the amount of punitive
damages to a proportion of the compensatory damages.22
Although the Cooper Court hinted that this situation might call
for review under abuse of discretion, thereby implicitly
acknowledging its support of statutory caps, it left the question
unanswered.22
The Court has frowned upon this disjointed approach to
appellate review in the past, most notably in Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp.22 In Hartmarx, the Court specifically refused
to adopt a three-tiered standard of review for Rule 11
motions.23 Similar to Cooper, the defendants in Hartmarx
advocated a review of historical facts for clear error,
determinations of whether or not a lawyer violated Rule 11 for
abuse of discretion, and the appropriate sanctions awarded by
a district court under a de novo standard. 3' In rejecting this
confusing approach, the Hartmarx Court pointed to the need
for a unifying standard of review. 32 Moreover, the Court
adopted an abuse of discretion standard for all three issues,
finding that "a district court, familiar with the issues and
litigants . .. is better situated than the court of appeals to
225 See, e.g., Mosing v. Domas, 830 So. 2d 967, 978 (La. 2002) ("We note that
two of the BMW factors . . .mirror three of the factors traditionally considered by
Louisiana appellate courts in reviewing exemplary damage awards . . . ."); Romo v.
Ford Motor Co., 99 Cal. App. 4th 1115, 1147 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) ('In reviewing the
verdict the appellate court is guided by three main [state law] factors: the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the actual harm suffered by the victims,
and the wealth of the defendant."). See also Brief of Respondent at 41. As the
Leatherman brief noted, "[iindeed, the same portion of the district court's decision may
provide a common predicate for the federal constitutional and state-law excessiveness
questions." Id.
221 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 450 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
221 See infra note 234.
2' Id. at 440 n.13. The Court stated '[wie express no opinion on the question
of whether Gasperini would govern-and de novo review would be inappropriate-if a
State were to adopt a scheme that tied the award of punitive damages more tightly to
the jury's finding of compensatory damages." Id.
29 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
20 Id. at 405.
231 id.
222 Id. at 403.
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marshal the pertinent facts and apply the fact-dependent legal
standard."233
In the end, appellate courts reviewing determinations of
constitutional punitive excessiveness will be faced with a
confusing, multi-tiered standard of review. An appellate judge
will have to review some challenges de novo, others for abuse of
discretion and factual findings for clear error. In addition, if an
appellate court is applying the substantive law of a state that
has adopted some form of restriction on punitive damages, the
court will be in the uncomfortable position of trying to guess
the correct standard of review.234
B. De Novo Review Will Not Provide Significantly Different
Results
Abuse of discretion review provides a sufficiently
rigorous and intensive post-verdict check on excessive punitive
damages. In fact, it is difficult to imagine that de novo review
will result in a greater number of punitive damages award
reductions. As Justice Ginsburg noted in her Cooper dissent,
"that approach [de novo review] and mine [abuse of discretion
review] will yield different outcomes in few cases."235 Rustad's
1998 article only reinforces this proposition. Rustad found that
federal appeals courts using abuse of discretion review had
upheld only three out of eleven punitive damages awards since
the Court's decision in BMW.23 The remaining eight awards
were either remanded or reversed.237  For example, in
233 Id.
234 This confusion recently occurred in John St. John v. Coisman, 799 So. 2d
1110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). Judge Sharp, who wrote the opinion, held that de novo
review was applicable when reviewing a trial judge's determination of the
constitutionality of a punitive damages award, even though the damages were capped
under Florida law. Id. at 1112. Whereas Judge Sawaya, in his dissent, strongly argued
that Cooper's de novo standard of review did not apply when punitive damages were
capped pursuant to Florida's statutory scheme. Id. at 1120-26 (Sawaya, J., concurring
& dissenting in part).
23' Cooper, 532 U.S. at 450 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
'36 Rustad, supra note 31, at 40. The following three cases were affirmed
under an abuse of discretion standard: Neibel v. Trans World Assurance Co., 108 F.3d
1123 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming a $500,000 punitive damages award in a RICO claim);
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming a $1.2 billion punitive
damages award in a class action lawsuit for human rights violations including torture
and executions); and Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming punitive
damages awards of $60,000 each for two prisoners who were beaten by guards and
denied medical assistance). Rustad, supra note 31, at 40 n.151.
137 Rustad, supra note 31, at 40. The following eight cases were either
reversed, vacated or remitted under an abuse of discretion standard: Continental Trend
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Continental Trend Resources, Inc. v. OXY USA, Inc., 238 the
Tenth Circuit used the abuse of discretion standard to slash a
punitive damages award for tortious interference from $30
million to $6 million.239 Likewise, in Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 4 ° the Eighth Circuit applied the abuse of discretion
standard and reduced a punitive damages award from $5
million to a mere $50,000.241 Nor have smaller punitive
damages awards escaped the intense scrutiny of abuse of
discretion. In Lee v. Edwards,"2 the Second Circuit reduced a
$200,000 punitive damages award to $75,000.43 And in
Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp.,' " the Fifth Circuit
vacated a $150,000 punitive damages award arising out of a
race discrimination case. 245 As the Court in Koon v. United
States... pointed out, the mere fact that the standard of review






Moreover, four studies of punitive damages awards have
found that post-verdict scrutiny of these awards at both the
trial and appellate levels is sufficiently rigorous. 48 The first
study ("Rustad/Koenig 1"), conducted by Professors Michael L.
Resources, Inc. v. OXY USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 634 (10th Cir. 1996) (reducing a punitive
damages award from $30 million to $6 million); Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107
F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 1997) (reducing a punitive damages award from $5 million to
$350,000); Gilman v. BHC Securities, Inc., 104 F.3d 1418 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that in
light of the small compensatory damages claimed by members of a class action, a
possible punitive damages award of $50,000 would not be feasible under BMW); Lee v.
Edwards, 101 F.3d 805 (2d Cir. 1996) (remitting a $200,000 punitive damages award to
$75,000); Moreno v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 99 F.3d 782 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 did not provide for punitive damages and
vacating plaintiffs punitive damages award of $1.3 million); Atlas Food Systems &
Services Inc. v. Crane National Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587 (4th Cir. 1996) (affirming a
district court's remittitur of a punitive damages award from $4 million to $1 million);
BE & K Construction Co. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 90 F.3d 1318 (8th Cir.
1996) (reversing the judgment due to insufficient evidence and noting that the punitive
damages award appeared excessive under BMW); Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp.,
90 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 1996) (vacating a $150,000 punitive damages award as excessive
under BMW). Rustad supra note 31, at 40 n.152.
238 101 F.3d 634 (10th Cir. 1996).
239 Id.
240 107 F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 1997).
241 id.
242 101 F.3d 805 (2d Cir. 1996).
243 id.
244 90 F.3d. 927 (5th Cir. 1996).
2A5 Id.
2A6 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
247 Id. at 98.
248 See Rustad, supra note 31 (discussing the four studies at length).
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Rustad and Thomas H. Koenig, analyzed punitive damages
awards in state and federal products liability cases from 1965
to 1990.249 The second study ("Rustad/Koenig 2"), also
conducted by Professors Rustad and Koenig, examined state
and federal punitive damages awards in medical malpractice
cases between 1963 and 1993.250 The third study, undertaken
by the Government Accounting Office ("GAO"), analyzed
punitive damages awards in products liability cases from five
states between 1983 and 1985.251 The fourth study, conducted
by Judge Richard Posner and Professor William Landes
("Posner/Landes"), examined products liability cases "reported
in the most recent volume of each of the West Publishing
Company's case reporters."25" The Posner/Landes study also
scrutinized products liability cases in federal appellate courts
between 1982 and November of 1984.53 Although each study
employed different techniques and examined various tort
claims, all found that punitive damages often were reduced
upon post-trial review. 54
For example, the Rustad/Koenig 1 study found that
while "[a] quarter of the punitive damages awards in products
liability were affirmed by appellate courts," a greater number
of verdicts were reduced.255 Indeed, "[nlearly one-third of the
punitive damages verdicts were ultimately reversed or reduced
by appellate panels."256 Likewise, the Rustad/Koenig 2 study
concluded that "[jiudges frequently vacate, remit or reverse
punitive damage awards in medical malpractice cases."57 In
fact, the study found that "[olnly 58% of verdicts reviewed post-
249 Id. at 42-43.
250 Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Reconceptualizing Punitive
Damages in Medical Malpractice: Targeting Amoral Corporations, not "Moral
Monsters," 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 975 (1995).
251 Rustad, supra note 31, at 22-23. The five states studied were Arizona,
Massachusetts, Missouri, North Dakota and South Carolina. Id.
252 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, New Light on Punitive Damages,
REGULATION, Sept./Oct. 1986, at 34.
25 Id. at 34-35.
254 Rustad, supra note 31, at 40. Moreover, Rustad noted that the studies also
found that "[plunitive damages are far more likely to be reversed or remitted than
compensatory damages." Id.
255 Id. at 42. The Rustad/Koenig 1 study also found that "four in ten punitive
damages verdicts were ultimately settled post-trial. For cases settled prior to appeal,
the plaintiff received the full amount of punitive damages in only about one in two
cases." Id.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 44.
[Vol. 68: 3
2003] A WRONG TURN ON THE ROAD TO TORT REFORM 919
trial were affirmed."258 Similarly, the GAO study found "post-
trial reductions in 82% of the twenty-three punitive damages
verdicts studied."59 Moreover, "[aippellate courts reversed or
remanded for retrial all punitive damage awards on which they
ruled."6° Finally, the Posner/Landes study found that out of the
172 cases studied, courts upheld punitive damages on appeal in
only four.26' This amounted to punitive damages awards
surviving appellate scrutiny in "fewer than three percent of the
cases."22 Thus, de novo review will not result in greater
scrutiny or more reductions than under abuse of discretion
review.
Furthermore, de novo review, while garnering the same
results as abuse of discretion, will over-burden appellate
courts. Indeed, defendants will be more eager to appeal a
punitive damages award if they are assured a plenary second
look by appellate courts. This will only increase the already
exhaustive caseload facing federal judges today.263 In fact, a
study by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts found
that "[flederal judges have seen their caseload and associated
workload rise significantly over the past five years.""'
Appellate judges in particular have seen a dramatic increase in
their caseload.265 In 1997, Congress went so far as to create a
commission to study the federal appellate system and
recommend structural changes to deal with the courts'
'5 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 250, at 1012. Rustad/Koenig 2 also found that
[olverall, the median punitive damage award was 1.21 times the median
compensatory damage award." Id. at 1009-10.
259 Rustad, supra note 31, at 42.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 41.
262 Id.
2r See generally COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS, Final Report, Dec. 18, 1998, submitted to the President &
Congress Pursuant to Pub. L. No. 105-119; Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 322
(1996).
26 Judicial Business of the United States Courts, 1999 Annual Report of the
Director, Mar. 14, 2000, at 15.
261 See COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF
APPEALS, Final Report, Dec. 18, 1998, submitted to the President & Congress pursuant
to Pub. L. No. 105-119 at 14 ("Over the last 100 years, filings per appellate judgeship
have increased by almost a factor of six. By contrast, filings per judgeship in the
district courts have not even doubled."); Judicial Conference of the United States, Long
Range Plan for the Federal Courts 132 (Dec. 1995) ([I]f conditions seriously
deteriorate in the courts of appeals, it may be necessary to consider some limitations on
the right to appeal.").
266 Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals.
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burgeoning workload."7  Among other problems, the
Commission's report found that "circuit judges have been faced
with relentlessly increasing caseloads"2 8 due to the fact that
"since 1960, circuit judgeships have grown roughly by 160%,
but appeals per judgeship have grown by 450%. "269 The
Supreme Court has also voiced concern about this problem,
cautioning in Behrens v. Pelletier27° that rising litigation
"threatens busy appellate courts with added numbers of
essentially similar, if not, repetitive appeals, at a time when
overloaded dockets threaten the federal appellate system."27'
Similarly, in Anderson v. Bessemer City,2 72 the Court warned
that "duplication of the trial judge's efforts in the court of
appeals would very likely contribute only negligibly . . . at a
huge cost in diversion of judicial resources." 273 Further, in
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,274 the Court endorsed abuse of
discretion review, and noted that "such deference will
streamline the litigation process by freeing appellate courts
from the duty of reweighing evidence and reconsidering facts
already weighed and considered by the district courts." 75 The
Hartmarx Court added that abuse of discretion review will
"discourage litigants from pursuing marginal appeals, thus
reducing the amount of satellite litigation."276
In sum, de novo review for determinations of
constitutional punitive excessiveness will differ little from
abuse of discretion in terms of results. However, de novo review
will burden appellate courts by adding to an already
267 COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATWES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF
APPEALS, Final Report, Dec. 18, 1998, submitted to the President & Congress pursuant
to Pub. L. No. 105-119 at iv. "Congress created this Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals ... to submit ... recommendations to
the President and Congress on changes in circuit boundaries or structure as may be
appropriate for the expeditious and effective disposition of the appellate caseload." Id.
268 Id. at 14.
269 Id.
270 516 U.S. 299 (1996).
271 Id. at 322 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Remarks of Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, Tenth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 146 F.R.D. 205, 257 (Apr. 1993) ("One of the chief
needs of our generation is to deal with the current appellate capacity crisis in the
Federal Courts of Appeals. Few could argue about the existence of such a crisis, born of
spiraling federal filings and an increased tendency to appeal District Court decisions.").
272 470 U.S. 564 (1985).
273 Id. at 574-75.
274 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
271 Id. at 404.
276 Id.
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overwhelming caseload. And, because abuse of discretion
review is sufficiently rigorous to scrutinize punitive damages
awards, there is no reason to depart from the traditional
standard.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has consistently voiced its concern
over the arbitrariness and lack of fundamental fairness
involved in juror assessments of punitive damages awards. In
formulating the BMW guideposts, the Court expressed the need
for protection against "purely arbitrary behavior" in awarding
punitive damages. 277 The Court in Haslip noted that "unlimited
jury discretion . . .may invite extreme results."2 "78 And in her
TXO dissent, Justice O'Connor vehemently argued for a
proportionality framework for punitive damages to ward off
capricious and arbitrary jury behavior.9 Now, with the
adoption of de novo review in Cooper, the Court has shifted its
attention away from the jury and onto the trial judge.
However, the Court's decision to curb the discretion of
the trial judge is the wrong way to ensure that punitive
damages awards comport with due process. Indeed, the real
problem with punitive damages is that there are few, if any,
standards to guide juries in the deliberative process. The
typical punitive damages instruction merely asks juries to
consider an amount that it thinks appropriate to both punish
and deter a defendant.2 ° It is the lack of standards in the jury
room that has lead to the inconsistent and, at times,
outrageous awards that we hear so much about from the
newsroom. Therefore, the Court would be better advised to
277 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996).
278 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
279 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 477 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
For example, a New York pattern jury instruction is as follows:
There is no exact rule by which to decide the amount of punitive damages.
The amount that you award as punitive damages need not have any
particular ratio or relationship to the amount you award to compensate the
plaintiff for (his, her) injuries. If you find that the defendant's act was
(wanton and reckless, malicious), you may award such amount as in your
sound judgment and discretion you find will punish the defendant and
discourage the defendant or other (people, companies) from acting in a
similar way in the future.
N.Y. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-Civil 2:278, Damages-Punitive (3d ed. 1996).
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
refine its procedural checks on the boundless discretion of the
jury.
One way the Court could accomplish this task would be
to incorporate the BMW factors into jury instructions. This
would provide a suitable framework within which a jury could
make a punitive damages assessment based on substantive
standards. A trial judge would then review the jury's
application of the BMW factors "de novo" and appellate courts
would review trial judges' decisions for abuse of discretion. If
all three actors in the judicial process were working with the
same guideposts, it might help to bring more consistency to the
verdicts.
Perhaps the most interesting idea, however, has come
from Professor Richard W. Murphy in his recent Washington
Law Review article.28' Professor Murphy advocates the use of
"explanatory verdicts" for juries when awarding punitive
damages.282 These verdicts would articulate a jury's underlying
reasons for assessing a specific punitive damages award and
provide an opportunity for the jury to present them at trial. 83
Professor Murphy argues that explanatory verdicts would be
helpful for three reasons. 2' First, explanatory verdicts would
ensure that juries "exercise their punitive discretion reasonably
and legally."285 Moreover, if a jury's explanatory verdict was
shown to be erroneous, a court could easily correct it by "asking
a jury to reconsider in light of supplemental instructions." 88
Second, since juries use punitive damages to "send messages"
to defendants, "these messages would be clearer if juries used
words as well as numbers to express them."287 The jury's ability
to verbalize their moral outrage might even lead to a reduction
in excessive damages. Third, explanatory verdicts could prove
to be a useful research tool to learn "how real juries in real
cases justify their verdicts."288
In the end, there are no easy solutions to ensure that
punitive damages comport with due process. But, though the
281 Richard W. Murphy, Punitive Damages, Explanatory Verdicts, and the
Hard Look, 76 WASH. L. REV. 995 (2001).
282 Id.
283 id.
' Id. at 995.
285 Id.
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full impact of the Cooper decision remains to be seen, one thing
is clear: de novo review is not the answer.289
Lisa M. White'
289 Although the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Cooper less than
two years ago, there is already widespread confusion among state courts concerning
the implementation of de novo review. For example, appellate level courts in Georgia,
Louisiana, South Dakota, Indiana, New Jersey, Alaska, Minnesota and California have
all adopted de novo review in reviewing a trial court's review of the constitutionality of
an award of punitive damages, while retaining deferential review for common law
claims of punitive excessiveness. See Cent. Bering Sea Fisherman's Assoc. v. Anderson,
54 P.3d 271, 277 (Alaska 2002); Baker v. Nat'l State Bank, 801 A.2d 1158, 1162-63
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002); Stroud v. Lints, 760 N.E.2d 1176, 1180 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002); Leisinger v. Jacobson, 651 N.W.2d 693, 696 n.2 (S.D. 2002); Mosing v. Domas,
830 So. 2d 967, 970 (La. 2002); Time Warner Entm't Co. v. Six Flags Over Georgia
L.L.C., 563 S.E.2d 178, 183 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); Brantner Farms, Inc. v. Garner, No.
C6-01-1572, 2002, Minn. App. LEXIS 625, at *17 (Minn. Ct. App. June 4, 2002); Romo
v. Ford Motor Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 139, 165 (Ca. Ct. App. 2002). The Utah Supreme
Court, on the other hand, has adopted de novo review for all claims of punitive
excessiveness. See Diversified Holdings. L.C. v. Turner, Nos. 20000730 & 20010021,
2002 Utah LEXIS 222, at * 3 (Utah Dec. 27, 2002). The Supreme Court of New Mexico,
questioned whether the standard of review in Cooper was even constitutionally
mandated by the Supreme Court at all, or merely imposed in the exercise of its
supervisory powers of the federal courts. See Aken v. Plains Elec. Generation &
Transmission Coop., Inc., 49 P.3d 662, 668 (N.M. 2002). After deciding that Cooper did
indeed represent a constitutional mandate, the New Mexico court articulated the
'correct" standard of review when passing on the constitutionality of a punitive
damages award as follows: "that an appellate court must read the record before it
bearing.in mind, with respect to each relevant factor announced in BMW ... whether
the jury's award of punitive damages is comparatively reasonable." Id. at 669. An
appeals court in Iowa decided that Cooper required de novo review for claims of
punitive excessiveness under the Due Process Clause, but failed to even mention, let
alone apply, the BMW factors. See Grabbe v. Holiday Mobile Home Court, No. 2-079/01-
0794, 2002 Iowa App. LEXIS 940, at *9, *12, *13 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2002).
f B.F.A. 1996, New York University; J.D. Candidate 2003, Brooklyn Law
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